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o IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON CO STATE OF GEORGIA 
FILED I 
Y DEC 202007 
DEPUlY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNlY GA 
RICHARD W. MCWHORTER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
J. ROBERT WARD, 
Defendant. 
) 
) Civil Action No.: 2006CVI18867 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counsel for both parties appeared before the Court on December 10,2007, to 
present oral argument on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts 
III and Counts iV of the Counterclaim, filed September 20,2006; Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims for injunctive Relief, Usurpation of Business 
Opportunities, and imposition of a Constructive Trust, filed April 30, 2007; and 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count II, filed April 30, 2007. After 
reviewing the record of the case, the briefs submitted on the motions, and the parties' 
arguments, the Court finds as follows: 
FACTS 
purpose of purchasing Cumberland, Georgia, lots, selling them, and splitting the profits . 
. ~ .'"~..,.,.,-.,..,..'~~-~~-c;"~~::!"'::::' ....,.",.."""""...... . - _._. ,-,~""""",:<," ..... -- ~:='~::" ",£::"':o::-='" 0;:' ==::. :="~:::'::c' == :_"_"'_' .. --_-_-= __ -- .::::....:..~_=_ __ : .._.'.=~_' ... "- .:....:::...:-::: 
Plaintiff and Defendant executed Articles of Organization, but no Operating Agreement. 
On May 19, 2004, FH purchased two (2) lots (collectively referred to herein as the 
"Lots") with a promissory note on each from BB&T Bank ("BB&T"). Each note 
required a balloon principal payment on May 7, 2006. 
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o To obtain the loans, Plaintiff and Defendant each signed personal guarantees on 
the principal of the loans (individually, the "Guaranty"). Each party paid approximately 
$20,000 in closing costs. When BB&T requested additional collateral, Plaintiff offered 
Lot 66, which he owned individually. 
Plaintiff alleges that in exchange for offering Lot 66 as collateral, the Defendant 
agreed to pay all costs associated with the loans such as the quarterly interest payments, 
taxes, insurance, etc. Defendant was to be reimbursed for fifty percent (50%) of his out-
of-pocket, post-closing costs from the sale proceeds on the Lots before the profit 
distribution to the two members. 
Defendant acknowledges that he and Plaintiff entered into an oral agreement, but 
dispute the tenns. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff pledged Lot 66 as collateral because 
Plaintiff initiated this investment opportunity and Defendant did not want to infuse cash 
into the deal. Defendant alleges that he and Plaintiff agreed to split all out-of-pocket, 
post-closing costs on a SO-SO basis. Additionally, Defendant highlights that the security 
interest granted in Plaintiffs Lot 66 was never perfected due to a complication arising 
from Plaintiffs sale of a fifty percent (50%) interest in Lot 66 post-closing. 
_ _ .. _ ." __ _ _.. _ .. _ t".. _ _ _ _ _ , __ ... 
August, 2005, sought a fifty percent (50%) contribution from Plaintiff. 
the BB&T loans. In October 2005, Plaintiffs counsel received an email communication 
infonning them of Defendant's desire to purchase the BB&T loans and requesting 
Plaintiffs signature to consent. Plaintiff inquired about Defendant's intent with regard to 
C) the loans/property. Thereafter, communications went no further between Plaintiff and 
2 
o Defendant. Eventually Defendant purchased FH's loans from BB&T in December 2005, 
although Plaintiff did not consent to the assignment and no notice of the sale was 
provided to him. 
On May 7,2006, the balloon payment on both FH Loans became due. On May 8, 
2006, Defendant sent a demand notice to Plaintiff requesting payment within ten (10) 
days. No payment was received and Defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings, which 
were stayed by various injunctions and finally by a lis pendens filed on the properties. 
Plaintiff initiated this suit against Defendant alleging, among other things, breach of 
fiduciary duties and damages related to Defendant's purchase of the FH Loans from 
BB&T. 
STANDARD 
C) To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, to warrant judgment as a matter oflaw." Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532 
(2005). 
• -" -- . - - - - -- -,--_ .. --- -- _______ . 'or-- -"'--0-'- - •. -. '. ____________ ._'_ •. _n __ -.---.-
III (Enforce the Guaranty that II signed) and CountsIV (Contribution) 
Defendant urges this Court to enforce the Guaranty signed by Plaintiff. 
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Defendant seeks fifty percent (50%) of the principal due on the FH loans, plus interest 
and fees/costs. The issue ofthe Guaranty and its enforceability, however, is inextricably 
intertwined with questions of whether any fiduciary duties were breached in Defendant's 
acquisition ofthe loans, the consequences of such breaches, if any, and damages. 
() Therefore, while there is no dispute that Plaintiff signed the Guaranty with Defendant for 
3 
o both FH Loans, Plaintiff's obligations thereunder in light of the questions surrounding 
Defendant's acquisition ofthe FH Loans cannot be detennined at this time. 
Similarly, Defendant requests summary judgment on its counterclaim for 
Contribution to recoup one half of his post-closing, out-of-pocket expenses on the FH 
loans. 
Plaintiff and Defendant admit to making an oral agreement regarding post-
closing, out-of-pocket expenses on the FH loans. In exchange for Plaintiff's provision of 
additional collateral (Lot 66), Plaintiff claims that Defendant agreed to pay all costs 
upfront and to be reimbursed out of sale proceeds. 
Defendant, however, argues that the parties agreed to share all expenses at the 
time they came due. Defendant also argues, in his briefs submitted on the issue, that if 
there was an oral agreement, it was invalid under the Statute of Frauds because the two 
(2) year tenn of the loan prevented it from being performed in less than one (1) year. 
O.C.O.A. § 13-5-30. 
While Plaintiff acknowledges that the security interest offered to BB&T on Lot 66 
was never perfected, Plaintiff argues that he performed, or at least has partially 
Frauds defects in the alleged oral agreement. O.C.O.A. § 13-5-31 (the statute of frauds 
other in accordance with the contract ... " or "where there has been such part performance 
of the contract as would render it a fraud of the party refusing to comply if the court did 
not compel a performance."). 
CJ 
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o By offering Lot 66 to secure the FH loans and working with BB&T to provide the 
additional collateral required under the loans, Plaintiff may have partially perfonned 
sufficient to overcome any Statute of Frauds defect in the alleged oral agreement. Thus, 
there remains a question of fact appropriate for a jury to detennine. 
In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaim Counts III (Guaranty) and IV (Contribution) is DENIED. 
II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims for 
Injunctive Relief for Usurpation of a Business Opportunity and Imposition of 
a Constructive Trust. 
Plaintiff seeks a pennanent injunction to prevent Defendant's foreclosure on the 
land and for the FH loans and guarantees to be placed in a constructive trust as a result of 
the alleged breached fiduciary duties, usurped business opportunities, and unjust 
enrichment resulting from Defendant's acquisition and enforcement of the FH loans. 
First, Defendant petitions the Court to grant him summary judgment on Count IV 
of Plaintiffs complaint seeking a pennanent injunction on the enforcement of the FH 
Loans. As a basis for such injunctive relief, Plaintiff cites Defendant's allege breach of 
fiduciary duties owed to FH and breach ofthe oral agreement between the members. 
n •••• "'_ •• <;r. 
alleged in this case. Plaintiff counters that because waterfront property is the subject of 
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requirements for an equitable remedy pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 23-1-4. This Court 
disagrees. What is fundamentally at issue between the parties is a monetary investment, 
which was nevertheless in the fonn of property. Thus, this case is not automatically 
C) appropriate for equitable remedies by virtue of the property in question. 
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C) However, before the issue of injunctive relief can be properly before this Court, a 
detenuination must be made on the underlying questions of breach of fiduciary duty and 
the alleged oral agreement, whatever its tenns were, which are reserved for detenuination 
by a jury. 
Second, Defendant petitions the Court for summary judgment on Count III of 
Plaintiffs Complaint for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Constructive trusts are imposed under O.C.G.A. § 53-12-93 "whenever the 
circumstances are such that the person holding legal title to property, either from fraud or 
otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest in the property without violating some 
established principle of equity." A constructive trust may be imposed where one is 
unjustly enriched as a result of breaching fiduciary duties owed to another. See, e.g., 
o Lane Co. v. Taylor, 174 Ga. App. 356 (1985). 
Without resolving the threshold question of whether Defendant was unjustly 
enriched as a result of purchasing the FH loans, however, a decision on the imposition of 
a constructive trust is premature. Thus, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. 
Plaintiff petitions this Court to grant summary judgment on Count V of his 
"".,....~_."""'~-=~.~~ .... ~~ ... _ ~'."""""'"_" _~_'="""'~'-.",".~,..".._. '''''''''''''-.''_'''''''''*T __ "'_"""''"'''''-__ .··'''='''''''''''_'''_~:_'-_'·'·T_' '""",,-.'_r"T.'''-_'-O-'~_ 
complaint seeking a decree of judicial dissolution of FH. 
Under O.CG.A. § 14-11-603, a member of, or the LLC itself, may petition the 
Court for a decree dissolving the company "whenever it is not reasonably practicable to 
carryon the business in confonuity with the articles of organization or a written operating 
o agreement." Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on this Count pursuant to O. C.G .A. § 14-
6 
o 
() 
o 
11-601.1 (b)(5), which states that a person ceases to be a member of an LLC whenever 
enumerated events occur, including an unresolved petition (after 120 days) for 
dissolution. After reviewing the statutes implicated and the case law interpreting the 
limited liability code of Georgia, it is not clear to this Court that these two statutes may 
be used as a vehicle to remove a member and dissolve the company in a suit where the 
LLC in question is not a party to the action. 
In accordance with the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Count V is DENIED. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated above, Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts III 
and Counts IV of the Counterclaim, filed September 20,2006, is hereby DENIED; 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims for Injunctive Relief, 
Usurpation of Business Opportunities, and Imposition of a Constructive Trust, filed April 
30,2007, is hereby DENIED; and Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Count II, filed April 30, 2007, is hereby DENIED. 
_ _ _ , r __ . 
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Superior ,Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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James Sherrian, Esq. 
Margaret G. Geer, Esq. 
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